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I. Introduction 
Association Agreements 
between the EC and Central 
and Eastern European States 
The second half of the 1980s was rul extraordiucuily hopeful time for the people of 
Western, Central and Eastern Europe. Waves of euphoria swept tile continent as the 
Europerul Community (EC) rushed headlong to complete its internal market by the end 
of 1992, and as the countries of the fonner Soviet bloc one by one ca..o;t aside the Iron 
Curtain that had enshrouded them for decades. Everyone stretched out his anns to 
embrace the other, and the strong helped the weak, no questions asked. It was a rare 
period of virtually unconditional brotherly love. It could not last. 
It did not. The tide begrul to tum in the early 1990s, ~L<; the bloom faded from the Ee 
rose, as Yugoslavia feU apart, as the enormity of the task of transfonning the Central and 
East Europerul economies becrune apparent, llild, not coincidentally, as the global 
recession deepened. No one but the most hardened Ellrocynic, however, would have 
predicted the severity of the Ee's reversal of fortune and the accomprulying shift in 
attitudes. 
At tlle close 01' the celebrated 1992, the European Community was in a state of 
political a.nd economic disarray. EC self-doubt-unleashcd by the Ma.astrich debacle, by 
it" inadequate response to the civil war in fonner Yugoslavia, and by recession lli1d 
intractable disputes with its trading partncrs--rendered the Community a less d~L<;hing 
knight to the distressed rcfonn economies in Central and Eastern Europe. Yet these 
countries continued to wait for some kind of miracu}()llS rescue. 
To be fair, the countries of Central llild Eastem Europe have good cause to be 
impatient for mm'ked improvement in their economic si tuation, since they reasonably fear 
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the political instability that lurks just around the bend. And to irs credit, the EC bas 
stayed a steady course with its ardent neighbours, even while rocked by ongoing inlernal 
crises. The Community has moved sleadily to assist the transfonnation by providing 
funds l and expertise, 3ncl also to extend the privileges and responsibilities of integration 
to ever more European countries through a network of bilateral a..o;;sociation agreements.2 
Association agreements that establish increased trade, dialogue and cooperation be-
tween the EC and the countries of Central and Bastem Europe have proliferated in recent 
years. Yet still the relationship between the Ee and countries in this region bas been 
characterized by a significant degree of mutual misunderstanding and dissatisfaction. On 
one side, the high expectations of the Central and East Europcml countries are reflected 
in their equally high disappointmenl levels vis-cl-vis lhe EC. And on the other side, one 
senses that the EC grows weary of what it perceives as complaints and ingratitude. 
Against this background, I propose to examine two related issues. l~irst> I will 
describe the nature and assess, the strengths and weaknesses of the association 
agreements themselves. And second, I will examine some recent developments ill the 
relations between tile EC llild the countries of Central tU1d Eastem Europe, notably the 
Memorandum subniitted by the Visegrad Group of countries3 to the EC in October 1992, 
and the EC's respollse to tile dcm<Ulds raised therein, ill order to assess the ClilTent state 
of relations. 
II. The Association Agreements 
In December 1991, the EC concluded bilateral association agreements with the countries 
comprising Ole Visegrad Group, viz. Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. These 
treaties, which were entitled "Europe Agreement.;;" in order to distinguish them from 
previous ronns of association,4 establish a frmnework for political and economic 
integration over a ten-year term. Often rcfcrred to as "Second Generation" agreements , 
to further distinguish tilem from earlier trade and cooperation (or so-called "Hrst 
1 Funds ha",'c been made available directly to countrie., in the region through tll<' PIIARE (Poland/Hungary: 
Assistance for Rcstrucruring of tlle Economy) and TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of 
Independent Stat~~) programs. See also Proposal for a Commission Decision granting a Community guarantee 
to the European lnve$tlnent Bank againBt losses under loans for projects in Central and East European countries 
(Poland, Hungary, th~ C;r.ech Republic, the Slovak RepUblic, Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and 
Albania). COM(93) 212 final, OJ 1993 C 160/8. 
2 Altic1e 238 of the Treaty of Rome provides thaI association agreement~ "involving reciprocal rights and 
obligarious, common aCli~'n and special procedLU'es ... shall be concluded by tilt' Council, i1cti og uniln.ilJ)ously 
and after receiving the assent of the European Parliamt'llt which shall act hy an ahsollltt' lIl:ljority of its 
compont~nt mt'.lllht~rs". 
3 Hllngary, Poland, the Czech Repuhlic and Ih~ .'Ilovak Republic (th~n Czechoslovakia) began to coonlinat.e 
their positions in 1991 during their respe.ctive negotiations with the EC on the conclusion of bilate.ml a,5sociation 
agreements. 
4 See Communication from the COlllmission to the Council on Association Agreemenls wjth tile Countries 
of Central and East Europe: General Framework. COM(90) final 398 (27 August 1990), 
1 
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Generation") agreements, the Europe Agreements represent a giant step on the long road 
toward integration, which actually began decades before the recent democratic 
revolutions. Each of the first three Europe Agreements in fact replaced an earlier 
bilateral First Generation trade and cooperation agreement, which in turn had replaced 
even earlier trading arrangements between the EC and the Visegrad countries. The same 
is true for the Europe Agreements that the EC concluded with Romania and with 
Bulgaria in late 1992. 
In addition to the Europe Agreements, t1le EC is expfUlding its network of trade 
nonnaliz.ation agreements with other countries in the region. For exempla, the EC has 
recently concluded First Generation trade and cooperation agreements with Albani.a5 and 
Slovenia. 6 One unique feature of these agreements is that they contain a clause expressly 
requiring regard for democratic principles and human Iight<;.7 Similar agreements were 
concluded with Estonia, Latvia and LithmUlia early in 1992.8 Relations with some 
members of the Commonwealth of Independent sL:'ltes are evolving as well. For example, 
negotiations with Russia and Ukraine for a new. intennediate type of "partnership ~U1d 
cooperation" agreement9 were recently resumed, after having been stalk .. d hy contro-
versy.!O Talks have also begun with Belarus, KazaksuUl and Kirghizstan. The 
Commission views (1) Are Ule following: the First Generation agreements as an interim 
step, and has stated that Europe Agreements should progressively be concluded with all 
eligible Central and East European countries. II 
The key difference between the First and Second Generation agreements lies ill the 
nature of trade they envisage. The First Generation trade and cooperation agreements only 
5 Agreement between the EEC and Albania on trude and cOJllmercial and economic cooperation, OJ 1992 
L 34312, implemented by Council Decision 92/535 of 26 October 1992 OJ 1992 L 343/1. 
6 Cooperation Agreement between Ule EEC and the Republic of Slovenia. signed 5 April 1993 and imple-
mented by Council Decision 93/4071 EEC of 19 July 1993 OJ 1993 L 189/1 (effective 1 September 1993), plus 
protocol on fina.ncial cooperation and agreement in tJle field of transport. 
7 Similar provisions appear in the Europe Agreements with Romania and Bulgaria, as well as in the 
renegotiated agreements with the CZCdl and Slovak Republics, but do not appear in the eArlier Europe 
Agreements with Hungary alld Poland. 
8 The Bailie States coucluded a free trade area among themselves on 13 September 1993 for the purpose 
of facilitating fastel integration into the EC. 
9 These agreements will have a wider scope tllan traditional First Generation agreements and will cover an 
extelJ.~jve range of trade, economic, and political reliltions over a ten~yeAr term. 
10 Russian has objected to the clause permitting the EC to suspend benefits in c. . ~e of human rights violation 
and has demanded that the agreement contain an "evolution" or "future events" clause permitting tlle agreement 
to be converted to a frce trade agreement when circumstances W<lfrant. See Agence Europe. Nr. 5993, p. 9 (4 
June 1993). Ukraine has insisted that it receive the same treatment a.~ Russia. 
11 ~ Commission "Guidelines on the Future of Relations between the EC and Central and Eastern Europe" 
(December 1992), rcprinJed in Agence Europe Documents, Nr. 1814, p. 2 (9 December 1992) (hereinafter 
Commission Guidelines). The Copenhagen European Council (June 1993) inviterl the Commission to submit 
proposals for developing the EC's exlsting trade agreements with t.he Baltic States into free trade agreements, 
and to conclude Europe Agreement.~ with these countries as soon as the necessary conditions have~ been met. 
Conclusions of the Presidency. Copenhagen European Summit, reprinted in Ag(!fJc(~ Europe Documents, Nr. 
1&44/45, Art. 7 (B). p. 6 (24 June 1993). 
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purporllU nonnalize trade relations by providing most-favoured-nation treatment and by 
progressively removing quantitative restrictions. The Europe Agreements. on the other 
band. aim to establish a free trade area by the end of the ten-year tenn, at least with 
respect to certain products. This means that the Europe Agreements provide preferential 
access to the Ee market for products originating ill Ule territory of the Associated 
country. Even more important, the Europe Agreements are based on the principle of 
asymmetric trade liberalization, which means that the EC must open up its market to 
products from the associated countries quicker that those countries must open their 
markets to products originating in the Ee. 
However, it is not just the nature of the trade envisaged timt differentiates the 
Europe Agreements from the more primitive First Generation agreements. Although both 
types of agreement call for certain forms of cooperation and contain an institutional 
component, the Europe Agreements go much furtller than the simple trade and co-
operation agreements. In addition to tlleir more extensive cooperation and institutional 
components, the Europe Agreements contt'lin innovative provisions calling for high-level 
political dialogue (to include malters of foreign policy and defence); for progressive 
liberalization of tile movement of persons, services and capital; and for gradual 
approximation of laws by tlle associated country. These provisions show that association 
under the Europe Agreements is meant to serve as a training ground for full EC 
membership, in addition to fostering economic development through the establishment 
of a free trade area. 
UnfortHnately, tile Europe Agreements have proven to be somewhat less than they 
appear. The first mtyor problem is that they have IlUl yet entered into force, since some 
EC Member States have failed to complete the ratiflcation process.12 Fortunately, major 
portions of Ute Europe Agreements fall within exclusive EC competence in the field of 
commercial policy, and tllllS CCUl be implemented by a decision of the competent EC 
organ. I) Still, failure to implement the Europe Agreements in their entirety means that 
m~my of their significant innovations have not yet been put into practice. The associated 
countries are especially looking forward to receiving the extensive economic, cultural and 
financial cooperation that the Ee ha<; promisee!. 
12 The Europe Agreements with the Yisegnld coulltJies were SUppOSt~d to enter into efft;!cl on 1 January 1993. 
However, the agreement between the Ee and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic had to be renegotiated 
follow.ing that country's split-up on 1 January 1993. TIlt:: rellcgolialed agreemenl~ between the Ee and the 
Czech and the Slovak Republics, respectively, werc initialled on 23 June 1993. 
13 lnterim Agreements to implement dIe trade and trade-related p"ats of the Europe Agreements willI 
Czechoslovakia. Hungary and Poland entered into effect on 1 March 1992 and wert! renewed for an indefinite 
period on 31 December 1992. See OJ 19921. 114 (Poland); OJ 1992 1. 115 (Czechoslovakia); and OJ 1992 
L 116 (Hungary). TIle Interim Agreement with Rom"ni" was implemented by Council Decision 93/186IEEC 
of 8 March 1993, OJ 1993 L. 81. TIle Interim Agreement with Bulgnria wa~ delayed by cOlllJOversy which was 
reportedly resolved in July 1993. However. no Interim Agreement between the Ee and Bulgaria ha..~ been 
implemented as of this date. 
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A second set of problems, less easily solved than the foregoing, stems from the 
protectionism that is built into the agreements. First. even the most far-reaching Europe 
Agreement grants only limited access to those sensitive sectors of the EC market. such 
as agriculture, steel and textiles, in which the Central and East European countries are 
likely to have a comparative advantage. Secondly, the a<;sociatioll agreements pennit both 
parties to invoke safeguard and other trade protection measures against products 
originating in the other party's terrltory.'4 The EC has already made use of these various 
opportunities-much to the dismay of the a<;sociated countries-for example by invoking 
protective measures to stop the spread of hoof and mouth disease; by imposing 
antidumping duties, such as on import'i of seamless pipes & tubes of iron or non-alloy 
steel coming from inler alia Hungary and Pohmd;'5 and by invoking safegumd measures 
to reimpose quotas on steel from the Czech mid Slovak Republics. '6 Finally, it has been 
observed that the Europe Agreements have in fact resulted in an increase in the Ee's 
trade surplus with the associated countries, despi Ie the asymmetric structure that was 
inLCuded to favour exports from the associated countries to the EC. 17 
Third problem is the lack of aspirational mutuality between the parties to the vmious 
Europe Agreement'). Each of these association agreement') recognizes that full Ee 
membership is the ultimate goal of each associated country, but make neither acces-
sion-nor even the cmnmencement of accession negotiations-automatic at the end of the 
ten-year transition period. The Europe Agreements nowhere SUlte that eventual accession 
is tile EC's goal as well. The Visegrad countries noticed that their yeaming for ever 
closer union was unrequited by the Ee, and begcUl to doubt the sincerity of Community's 
intentions. 
Although some might argue U1at the associated countries are hardly in a position to 
bargain, the vanguarLl Visegrad countries have not hesitated to press their claims with the 
Ee. It is nothing less than remarkable that they have been as sllccessful as they have ill 
the past yem', both in gaining the troubled COIIununity's ear, and in eliciting further 
concessions. 
14 Under the Europe Agreements, the associated countrit:s may take "exceptional Illcasun:s of limited 
duration" in order to protect "infant indlLstries or certain sectors undergoing restructuring or facing serious 
difficulties", 
15 See Council Regulation 1189/93 of 14 May 1993, OJ 1993 L 120/34. 
16 Decision No. 1/93 of the EC-Czech Republic and Slovak Republic Joint Committee of 28 May 1993, OJ 
1993 L 157/59; Commission Decision 1970193/ECSC of 19 July 1993 openi ng and providing for tile administra-
tion of tariff quotas in respect of certain ECSC products originating in the Czech Republic and the Slovak 
Republic imported into the Community (I June 1993 to 31 December 1995), OJ 1993 L 180/10. 
17 Polish rrime Minister Hanna Suchocka wrote a letter tll tile EC Heads of Government. and to Commission 
President Jacques Delors in which she stated: "Our expectations have nol been fulfilled. Today we are 
witnessing a sizeable lrade deficit with the Community, in excess of one-eighth of all our exports to the HC. 
That deficit points to inequality that t:ontradict.s what was intended by the Agreement ... [and] clearly indicates 
that the Community is the IIIain beneficiary of the Europe Agreement". Agence Europe, Nr. 5995, p. 9 (4 June 
1993) (hereinafter SUdll)cki. Letter), 
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Ill. Recent Developments in the Relations between the EC and the 
Associated Central and Eastern European States 
The EC and the associated countries agreed in principle tlmt the frmnework est.'lblished 
by the Europe Agreements must be fully exploited mId even extended in order to further 
the process of trllilsfonnation and integration.18 They have differed, over how to achieve 
this shared goal. 
The Visegrad countries stated their position in ajoint memorandum "Oll slrengtllening 
their integration with the European Communities ~Uld on the perspective of accession", 
which they submitted to the Commission IDld the Presidency in September 1992. In tbe 
1992 Visegrad Memorandum, the associated countries asked tile EC to establish specific 
criteria llild a timetable for accession. 19 In addition, they issued the call to "speed up the 
process" by strengthening political and financial cooperation, as well as by accelerating 
economic integration. The Commission responded by issuing "Guidelines on tlle Future 
of Relations between the EC and Central anel Eastem Europe" in December 1992.20 In 
anticipation of tlle meeting of tlle European Council on 21-22 June 1993 in Copenhagen, 
tlle Visegrad countries submitted a second joint memorandum in which they expressed 
their overall (but not complete) support for tllC Commission's position, ,md empha.<;izcd 
tile imporlance which they attached to the outcome of tilat meeting?' 
The Copenhagen Smmnit represents a milestone for those Centra! (Uld East European 
countries that already have concluded or may in future conclude Europe Agreements with 
tlle EC. Among the many significant conclusions of t11at Europeml Council, I wish 1O 
emphasize four: conclusions conceming accession; political cooperation; trade liberaliz-
ation; and otller fonns of cooperation. 
A. Accession 
The Treaty of Rome provicles tilat [my European State may apply to become a member 
of the COlmnunity:u l11e Commission elaborated tllrce criteria to de/cnnine the eligi-
18 Joint SUltcmenl of EC aud Visegmd Forejgn Ministers (5 October I Y92 Luxelllbourg Summit), EC Bull. 
10 .. 1992, § 2. 3. I., point 5 (agreeing thaI c(Xlperation under Ihe Europe Agreements should focus on "consoli-
dating and extending progress"); "Europe ami the Challenge of Enlargement", EC Bull. Supplement 3/92, p. 
18 (hereinafter commission Enlargement Rep,.xI). 
19 In particular, they expressC'~1 their wish to join the \}lliLJIl "at the latest at IJle em! of III is century", and 
re.quested tlla.t formal negotiations OIl full membership start in 1996, more or Jess simultaneoLlsly wjth the. mid-
term review called for under the Europe Agreements. 
20 TIle.~e Commission Guidelines, supra note II, wcre debat.ed and sub~eqllenlly approved (with some 
modifications) by .he General Affairs Council that lIlet in Luxcmbourg in early JUlie 1993. 
21 TIle Suchocka Letre.r, supra note 17, called for the Europ.::an Council to give il dear political message 
confirming tlle COllllllunity's will t.o see Pl1land and the other associal.::d l:ounlries as futUlc IllClllbers of Iile 
European Union; to acct'laate and improve access of Polish produCIS tel th.: ('Ollllllllility Illillkcl; anti to increase 
EC aid and make it avajlahl[~ for economic and i nwstlllent (rnther than just technical) purpOSt:S. 
22 Alticle 237. Article 0 of the Treaty on F..lu·ol",an Union provides tht' smile with rl\~1xct to IllCmik!fsilip in the Ullion. 
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hility of a country that applies for membership: European identity, democratic status, and 
respect for bwnan righLS.23 These principles are broadly reflected in the preamble of the 
Europe Agreements.24 
The Copenhagen Surmnit Conclusions did not only state more particularly formulated 
criteria for membership, but also established the "objecti yes of membership" and affirmed 
that "the associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so des~ shall become 
members of the European Union".25By this step, the unilateral wish of the associated 
countries to join the EC becomes a shared goal. Although no specific date has been laid 
down for the commencement of accession negotiations, as was urged in the 1992 in the 
Visegrau Memorandum, the Copenhagen Summit Conclusions provided that, the 
accession can take place as soon as the a5sociated country is "able to assume the 
obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required". 
The eligibility criteria enunciated in Copenhagen are virtuaUy identical to those first 
proposed in the Commission Guidelines26 in December 1992. First, the associated 
country must achieve "st..1.bility of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and respect for protection of minorities". Second, the associated country 
must have a "functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union". Finally, the associated country 
must be capahle of k1.king on the obligations of membership (i.e. the acquis commu-
nautaire) and must adhere to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. 
These Copenhagen Summit Conclusions on accession are welcome, not least because 
they can themselves contJ'ibute towards achieving the goals they establish by encouraging 
further democratic refornls and foreign iuvestment. Yet reasonable grounds for 
dissatisfaction still remain. First, the Copenhagen Summit Conclusions undercut tile value 
of the accession provisions by reminding the associated countries that accession will 
ultimately hinge on the "Union's capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the 
momentum of European integration". Thus, the EC still views relations with Central and 
Eastern Europe as a subissue in iL<; debate over deepening versus widening the 
Community. Secondly, U1e community has failed to provide a timetable for evaluating the 
associated countries' progress in fulfilling the enunciated criteria. "The Central and East 
European countries hope that this process will begin during the mid-tenn review called 
23 Commission Enlargement Report, supra note 18. In partiCUlar, the Commission empha.5ized the applicant's 
"acceptance of the Community system, and its capacity to implement it" (which "presupposes a functioning and 
competitive market economy, and an adequat.e legal and mJlII.iuistrative framework in the public and private 
sector"), as well a$ the applica.nt' s acceptance and ability to implement "the common foreign and security policy 
a.~ it evolves over the coming years". 
24 For example, the preamble to the Hungarian Europe Agreement states that the "basis for association" is 
Hungary's "commitmem to plura.list oellJOCracy ba.5ed on rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
[toJ a multiparty system involving flee and democratic elections, to the principles of a market economy ane! to 
social justice" . 
25 Copenhagen European Coullcil, Conclusions of the Presidency, reprinted in Ageru:e Eumpe Documents, 
Nr. 1844f45, art. 7. (A) (iii), p. 5 (24 June 1993). 
26 Supra note 1l. 
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for in each of the Europe Agreements, but it is by no means assured. Finally, the 
accession criteria do little more than restate the obvious, and provide little concrete 
guidance. Yet it is hardly realistic to expect the Ee t.o tie itself to particular criteria at 
a time when the entire nature of Ule Community is changing. 
B. Political Cooperation 
Central and East European countries have expressed a strong desire to participate fully 
in the fonnulation of the future architecture of Europe. Both the EC and the Visegrad 
conntries readily agree on the need to deepen the pohucal dialogue established under the 
Europe Agreements?1 While substantial agreement prevails at this level of generalities, 
traces of dishannollY emerge upon duser examination. There are two primary sources of 
tension. 
The first problem in the area of political cooperation concerns the nature of 
cooperation contemplated. The 1992 Visegrad Memorandum expressly sought "gradual 
incorpofi1tion ." into the political cooperation of the European Communities, especially 
via direct linking to the Common Foreign and Security Policy as of January 1, 1993". 
This has not happened. Instead, the Copenhagen European CounCil proposed that llie 
associated countries enter into a "structured relationship with tlle IntitutioIlS of the 
Union" concerning "dialogue and concerlation rsicj on a broad range of topics and in 
several fora".28 This purely advisory discussion framework will encompass diverse 
matters of common interest, including areas of Community pOlicy,29common foreign 
and security policy, and home and judicial affairs. It provides for regular meetings at 
various levels of govt,,-rnment, with enlarged Council meetings as the primary forum for 
discussion.3D 
The "structured relationship" for political cooperation appears to he derived from the 
Commission's earlier proposal to create a "Europ~U1 Political Area" as a me,IDS of 
extending the basis of political cooperation beyond the Europe Agreements, but without 
27 '[11e Europ.: Agre . .:ments call fOf Icgular political dialogue to consider issues arising under the a.ssociation 
agreements themselvcs, as well a5 any other bilatt!ral or international issues of mutual interest. 'Ole ill~tjtutjollal 
framework will be composed of an Association Coulll:il, an Association Committee, and an Association Parlia-
mentary Committee. 
28 Copenhagen European Council, Conclusions of the Presidem;y, Agl'nce Europe Documents, NT. 1844/45, 
art. 7(A) (iv), pp. 5-6 (24 June 1993). 
29 Particularly those with a trans-European dimension, such as energy, envirulllIlenl, transport, science and 
technology. 
30 For exampll':, the Copenhagen Summit Conclusions call for one Troika meeting at the level of Foreign 
Ministers and one at the level of political directors during each Presidency; a briefing at secretariat level after 
each General Affairs Council and eaeh meeting of the political directors; one Troika meeting at Working Gwup 
level per Presidency for relevant Working Groups; and regular Troika consultaJions with the United Nations 
General Assembly and the Conference for Sj>curity and Cooperation in Europe. Copenhagen European Council, 
Conclusions of the Presidency, Agence Rurnpe Documents, Nr. 1844/45, annex II, p. 11 (24 June 1993). 
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interfering with "the Community's own autonomous development".31 The 1992 
Visegrad Memorandum res.ponded cautiously to this proposal, since the associated 
countries feared it would be viewed by the Ee as a substitute for full membership. In 
the wake of the Copenhagen European Council's adoption of the objective of 
membership, this fear bas been succeeded by cautious optimism about the new 
framework for political cooperation, even mougb it grants less than the associated 
countries bad hoped for. 
The second problem in the area of political cooperation concerns the multilateral 
framework proposed by the BC. Although the Europe Agreements themselves are 
bilateral, tile "structured relationship" for political cooperation is designed to include all 
the associated Central and East European countries.32 The EC has repeatedly 
emphaSized that such dialogue should be carried out on a multilateral basis. In addition, 
the EC has urged tile associated countries (in particular, the Visegrad countries) to 
pursue regional cooperation. This is a very sensitive issue. The Visegrad countries have 
undertaken to coordinate a number of activities, including their economic relations,33 
their relations with oU1el' European institutions, and their security policies. However, 
there are serious tensions within the Visegrad group today, which raise doubts about the 
strength of these countries' desire to continue cooperating within mis framework. 
Aside from the regional tensions themselves, the Central and East European 
countries are suspicious of the EC's multilateral leanings. In particular, they fear the 
creation of a "Europe bis" in this region, a "new division in Europe, the creation of a 
zone protecting the Community from the the insecUlity coming from the East, and that 
this Europe-bis [might] become something permanent as was the case of the past 
European bistorical developments".34 The vanguard Visegrad countries have been 
especially disturhed to realize mat the EC increasingly sees and prefers to deal with 
Central and Eastem Europe as an amorpholls whole. The result is misunderstanding on 
bolll sides, despite the best intentions. 
Although I would critici/,e the Ee Member States for failing to ratify me Europe 
Agreements concluded nearly two years ago willi the Visegrad countries, I believe that 
the multilateral approach is a sensible, if not an essential approach to the reorientation 
of Europe. Even under optimal economic circumstances, the EC could hardly provide 
a complele substitute for trade and political dialogue with neighbouring Central and East 
31 Commission Guidelines, supra note II. at p. 6. See also Commissiull Eulargement Report, supra note 18, 
at p. 18. 
32 Thus, the 21 September 1993 meeting between the Ee TlOika and the Poreign Ministers of the a.ssocia.ted 
Central and E .. '\Sl European countries was attended by representatives of all six countries that have concluded 
Europe Agreements willl the Ee to date (i.e. Bulgm'ia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, a.nd the 
Slovak Republic). 
33 For example, they concluded the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), which purports to 
create equal conditions to those betwee,n the EC and the Visegrad countries. The CEFTA entered into force on 
1 March 1993. 
~4 Agence Europe: Together in Europe, Nr. 9, p. 2 (IS May 92). 
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European countries. In addition, regional cooperation is likely to be a key to the political 
and economic stability that is prerequisite to full membership. It should console the 
Central and East European countries to know that the currently ongoing accession 
negotiations with Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden "will, to the extent possible, be 
conducted in parallel, while dealing with each candidate on its own merit".3s 
C. Trade Liberalization 
It can come as no surprise that the 1992 Visegrad Memonmdum urged the EC to 
accelerate the economic integration foreseen by the Europe AgreemenL~, emphasizing 
that "[o]pening markets to our products remains ... the most important and efficient way 
of assisting our countries". In particular, tlle Visegrad counlries requested further 
asymmetrical trade concessions in all sectors, including the sensitive ones, as pennitted 
by the agreemen ts tllemsel ves. The December 1992 Commission Guidelines echoed their 
call for increasing the pace of liberalization mId removal of obsk1cles to trade in the 
sensitive sectors. 
In recognition of the crucial importance of tradc in the lransition to a market 
economy, the Copenhagen European Council agreed to accelerate the trade liberalization 
under tlle Europe Agreements. The Commission quickly prepared the different legal 
instruments to implement the trade concessions decided in principle in Copenhagen, and 
negotiated protocols to tlle Europe Agreements. The Council approved them and made 
them effective from 1 July 1993.36 In essence, the effects of these changes are to 
accelerate the suppression of customs duties Oil sensitive industrial products and the 
increases in quotas and ceilings; to suppress duties on textile and steel products earlier 
than originally provided; and to accelerate reduction of levies or duties and to increase 
quotas in the agricultural sector. 
Considering the difficult economic situation in the EC at this time, it is remarkable 
that any concessions have been obtained. It remains to be seen whether the associated 
countries will be satisfied with these improvements. It should be noted, however, tllat 
the Copenhagen European Council did not attempt to fashion ~Uly solution for the 
problems stemming from the Ee's increasing use of trade protection measures against 
imports from Central and Eastern Europe. 
3S Copenhagen European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency. AgcllCc Europc Documcnts, Nr. 1844/45, 
art. 4. p. 4 (24 June 1993). 
36 Council Decision 93/421IEEC of 19 July 1993 on the provisional application of the Additional Protocols 
to the Interim Agreements on trade and trade-related matters between the EEC and the ECSC, of the one part, 
and certain third countries, of the other P;lrt, and to the Europe Agreement~ l~tween the EC and Uleir Member 
Stales and the same countries, OJ 1991 L 195/42; Council Regulations 2232·2235193/EEC of 5 August 1993, 
OJ 1993 L 200. 
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D. Financial and Other Forms of Cooperation 
Another area in which the Visegrad countries have sought further conuniuncnts from 
the Ee is in regard to fin~U1cial cooperation. The 1992 Visegrad Memorandum sought 
a substantial increase ill aid and proposed that the EC's emphasis should shift from 
"more traditional technical assistance to greater support [or invcsul1cnt". Aside from 
ongoing refonus of the PHARE and TACIS programs themselves, the Copenhagen 
European Council agreed to make further commiunents in this field so that the 
assistance granted would be more effective. In particular, the EC will offer technical 
assistance to prepare and facilitate infrastructure improvement,>, as a complement to the 
decision made at tile Edinburgh Summit to support tile development of infrastructure 
networks?? 
In addition to fimmcial cooperation, the Copenhagen European CounCil addressed 
itself to two other fonns of cooperation designed to further economic integration. First, 
the Copenhagen European Council invited the commission to make proposals before the 
end of 1993 to open up Communist programs to Central and East European countries, 
as foreseen in the Europe Agreements, and instructed tile Commission to take as its 
point of departure those programs which are already open for panicipaljon by the EVIA 
countries?~ Second, the Copenhagen European Council agreed to assist tile associated 
countries in fulfilling their obligations to approximate their legislation to that of the EC. 
A task force will be est:'lblished for this purpose, and training will be provided to 
officials from the associated countries.39 
TV. Conclusion 
The result of the Copenhagen European Summit has been well received, at least in 
Hungary. If the EC Member States complete tile ratification process and I1lUS cause the 
Europe Agreements to enter into effect, then I predict a period of relative harmony 
during which the associated countries get on witil the business of transfonnation and 
approximation. Hungary for one will be consumed during the coming months with next 
year's election. Since there is a high degree of COIlS~lISUS here Oil the desirabilit.y of 
integration with the EC, the Europe Agreement is not likely to be a source of 
controversy during the campaign. 
37 Tile Icading role in lhis context win be takcn by the European 1IlVestll"~llt Bank, th~ European Bank for 
Rt:cuusuuction and Development and olher international financial institutions, mther than the EC itself. 
Copenhagen European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, AgcnGe Europe Documents, Nr. 1844/45, annex 
II, iX>int (iii) p. 12 (24 June 1993). 
38 Copenhagen European Council, Conclusions of the Presidl',ncy, Agcllcl' EllrujJl' Doculllellis, Nr. 1844/45, 
art. 7(A) (iv), p. 6 (24 June 1993). 
39 Copcnh~lgen European Council, Conclusiolls of the Presidellcy, Agena F£uropl' DOCllmellls, NL 1844/45, 
art. 7(A) (iv), p. 6, and annex ii. point (iv), pp, 12-1~ (24 June 199::1). 
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The prevailing attitude, at least in Hungary, accepts that tbe relations with the EC 
are like a marriage after the honeymoon is over. Jeml Monnet has been quoted as saying 
that close association means a destiny hencefortb shared. It is a time for the associated 
countries to formulate strategic plans for developing this close association, and to get 
on with the work. 
